MFN Clauses in Online Multi-Sided Platform Markets and Their Impacts on Consumer Welfare Standard

Ekingen E.

European Competition Law Review, vol.43, no.6, pp.270-282, 2022 (Peer-Reviewed Journal)

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Volume: 43 Issue: 6
  • Publication Date: 2022
  • Journal Name: European Competition Law Review
  • Journal Indexes: HeinOnline-Law Journal Library
  • Page Numbers: pp.270-282
  • Çukurova University Affiliated: No


Most-favoured-nation (MFN) clauses adopted in online multi-sided platforms (MSPs) in their own unique forms can be accepted as a guarantee given by a seller, aside from online MSP relationships, to the platform. According to this guarantee, the seller will treat the platform as favourably as its best customer. MFNs, which creates a significant restriction on the relationship between the undertakings, have many both anti-competitive and pro-competitive impacts on competition in the markets. However, it is indeed difficult to clearly state how MFNs affect the overall competition in the market. Mainly, MFNs cause harm to consumers in online MSP relations in terms of price, quality, choice and innovation criteria of consumer welfare standard. In order to analyse the consumer welfare aim of EU competition law, these effects need to be clearly analysed. For this reason, this article aims to explore how MFNs in EU competition law affect the consumer welfare standard in online MSP markets.